The fate of the Iran war centers on highly enriched uranium (HEU) — uranium enriched to weapons-capable levels that can be turned into an atomic bomb quickly. International inspectors have not been allowed to verify Iran’s stockpile since strikes last June, and U.S. and Israeli attacks and the ensuing war have complicated efforts to account for or secure remaining material. The U.S. faces two basic options: negotiate access to package and remove the HEU, or seize it by force — each with major challenges.
A blueprint exists: Project Sapphire, a 1994 U.S. operation in Kazakhstan that removed about 600 kilograms of 90% HEU. A young Foreign Service Officer, Andrew Weber, learned of a massive weapons‑usable cache at a nuclear factory. Through months of diplomacy and the building of personal trust — even informal gestures like hunting trips — the U.S. forged an agreement with Kazakhstan to accept the material. The covert operation used 31 specialists and three C‑5 Galaxy cargo planes to move the metal in specially built crash‑resistant drums to a DOE facility in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. It took six weeks from arrival to departure and relied on a willing partner and strict secrecy; every gram was accounted for, and the operation became the model for NNSA recoveries that have removed thousands of pounds of HEU worldwide.
But Iran today presents a far harder problem. U.S. officials say much of Iran’s HEU is stored well below ground at sites like Isfahan and a facility likely under Pickax Mountain. Satellite images show tunnel entrances, blocked approaches and increased internal fortifications: heavy earthworks, roadblocks and dispersed locations. Analysts say scuba‑tank‑sized canisters of HEU are kept in deep tunnels that bunker‑busting munitions may not reliably reach. If most HEU is indeed stored underground or spread across hardened facilities, bombing alone can’t eliminate the material or the knowledge to reconstitute a program.
Getting HEU out of Iran unilaterally is fraught. Dr. Matthew Bunn, a nuclear security expert, points to what inspections and verification actually provide: not only physical removal but international monitoring, transparency, and the ability to confirm all material is accounted for. Without inspectors on the ground, claims about “obliteration” of a program are unreliable: knowledge and remaining material can still allow weapon construction. Bunn stresses that the essential outcome is “no HEU” and “in‑depth monitoring,” but that trust and verification are now very difficult given war and diplomatic ruptures.
A kinetic recovery mission would be high risk. Former senior special operations leaders describe what would be required: large numbers of troops to secure a perimeter, special forces trained to operate in complex underground facilities, engineering units to clear rubble or build landing areas, and logistics to move and protect sealed containers. Forces would face threats from Iranian missiles, drones, and irregular fighters; casualties are likely and must be planned for. Vice Admiral Robert Harward and others say the operation is possible for U.S. forces, but it would entail occupying territory and holding a secure area while experts excavate and package HEU — potentially for weeks — under enemy fire and with many moving pieces.
The alternative — a negotiated transfer — is much safer but depends on Iranian agreement and hard verification. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has led many international HEU recovery efforts and stresses cooperation: historically, countries agree to have their material packaged and shipped to the U.S. for secure storage or down‑blending. NNSA officials say they have never successfully removed HEU from a country without that country’s cooperation. Retired officials who managed prior operations say willing partners are essential; even Project Sapphire succeeded because Kazakh authorities and officials worked with Washington.
Practical steps to remove HEU, if Iran agreed, would follow established patterns: identify and inventory all HEU, package it into certified crash‑resistant drums, rig secure overland and air transport, and move material to secure sites for storage or down‑blending. The U.S. would likely use NNSA technical teams with DOE logistical support and military security. In Project Sapphire, teams constructed and used heavy drums, loaded them onto C‑5s and moved the cargo under humanitarian cover; similar airlift and DOE storage processes would be used today, though modern intelligence and operational security realities differ.
Political and technical obstacles remain. Iranian denials — Tehran insists it will not hand over HEU — and public statements promising “we will get the dust back” raise the political stakes. The U.S. claims strikes set back Iran’s program, but experts caution that material and knowledge often survive attacks. UN and IAEA estimates noted Iran might hold hundreds of kilograms of 60% HEU before the war; enrichment from 60% to weapons‑grade is shorter than from low‑enriched feedstock, so even 60% stockpiles are alarming.
Even with a deal, rigorous verification is essential. Dr. Bunn and other specialists emphasize that any arrangement must include international monitors, continual oversight, and technical measures to ensure the stockpile is fully removed and cannot be reconstituted covertly. Unilateral military seizure provides no verification guarantee unless the operation is followed by transparent accounting and third‑party verification; but such transparency is unlikely in an adversarial unilateral raid.
Operational complexity also includes site specifics: Isfahan is reported to house HEU in deep tunnel complexes, perhaps under mountains, where bunker‑busting weapons may not reach canisters. Excavation under fire — or finding canisters in subterranean mazes — would be slow, dangerous, and require specialized equipment and personnel. Even if military forces secure a site, the process of packaging and transporting radiological material safely is delicate and requires DOE/NNSA capabilities.
In short, removing Iran’s HEU is technically feasible but politically and operationally difficult. Past success in Kazakhstan shows diplomacy and cooperation enable safe recovery and minimize risk to personnel; Project Sapphire removed large quantities in secrecy only because officials had permission and close coordination. Without Iranian cooperation, a recovery mission would be high‑risk, potentially costly in lives and escalation, and still leave hard verification questions. The most durable solution experts offer is negotiated removal combined with sustained international monitoring and transparency to ensure Iran cannot regenerate a covert weapons capability.