The following is a paraphrased transcript of former Defense Secretary Robert Gates’s interview with Margaret Brennan on Face the Nation, May 17, 2026.
MARGARET BRENNAN: If you’re ready, let’s begin.
ROBERT GATES: Yes.
BRENNAN: In December you said we may be living in one of the most dangerous periods in modern U.S. history. Why?
GATES: For the first time we face nuclear-armed adversaries in both Europe and Asia. Once China finishes modernizing, China and Russia together will have far more strategic warheads than we do. Beyond nuclear forces, China has huge manufacturing capacity and expanding technological and non-military levers—trade, development, strategic communications—that reach around the world. Put all of that together with the nature of those regimes and it makes this a very perilous era.
BRENNAN: You mean Russia and China are the principal adversaries?
GATES: Yes.
BRENNAN: President Trump called the U.S.-China relationship a possible “G2.” Are the two on equal footing?
GATES: Not yet. The military often calls China a near-peer. We still have advantages—military, economic and technological—but China is closing the gap in areas like shipbuilding. Both sides have domestic challenges, so they’re approaching our level, but they’re not fully there.
BRENNAN: The recent Trump-Xi summit produced mainly working groups and modest deliverables. What was accomplished?
GATES: The likely primary objective was to stabilize the relationship and prevent deterioration—keep a floor under ties and maintain the trade truce that’s been in place. Even if there weren’t big breakthroughs, preventing re-escalation and preserving commercial ties was probably the main goal for both sides.
BRENNAN: Xi’s public wording on Taiwan was strong. Should the U.S. shift its tone from strategic ambiguity?
GATES: The Chinese typically use strong rhetoric on Taiwan after arms sales or diplomatic moves. Changing America’s carefully worded position would be a mistake—experts dissect language and nuance. Maintaining the current stance was the right move.
BRENNAN: The administration has delayed about $14 billion in proposed arms sales to Taiwan. Should that be approved?
GATES: Yes. We should proceed with what’s been promised, but delivery and supply matter. There’s already a backlog of equipment we’ve sold to Taiwan that we can’t immediately deliver. Taiwan has also shifted toward buying weapons geared to defend against invasion—escalating anti-access/area-denial and systems like HIMARS and air-defense—rather than chasing options to retake the mainland. That is a useful and realistic change.
BRENNAN: There are concerns our stockpiles are depleted from support to Ukraine and strikes in the Middle East. Does that undermine deterrence against China?
GATES: It’s a real problem. We need to expand production capacity—new factories and new firms able to mass-produce precision-guided munitions, drones, defensive missiles like Patriot, THAAD, and SM-3. Ukraine’s wartime surge shows what’s possible, but we must treat this with urgency: funding, predictable procurement and accelerated factory builds.
BRENNAN: Do you think China will invade Taiwan, or use other methods to exert control?
GATES: A full-scale invasion appears unlikely in the near term. China has lower-risk options: economic and diplomatic pressure, blockades or a maritime and air quarantine—the so-called anaconda strategy—and influence operations inside Taiwan, including leveraging parties like the KMT. They prefer coercion and gradual pressure to a risky invasion that could destroy assets like chip factories. Also, China’s military has little recent combat experience and has been affected by Xi’s purges, which undermines confidence in its leadership.
BRENNAN: Shifting to the Middle East: you previously warned a strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure would buy time but not solve the problem. Do you still believe diplomacy is the only way to remove enriched uranium and end their program?
GATES: Yes. Removing deeply buried enriched uranium militarily would be complex and risky. Negotiations that compel Iran to relinquish or render unusable the enriched material are the most plausible path to ensuring they can’t build a bomb.
BRENNAN: Could the U.S. step back and leave the issue to Israel?
GATES: No. The U.S. can’t walk away and Israel cannot resolve this alone. The U.S. has unique capabilities and responsibilities. The stated goals—preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, degrading its military strike capacity, and reducing support for proxies—require sustained U.S. involvement. The nuclear program has been set back, but other objectives are ongoing.
BRENNAN: You were critical of Netanyahu in your book. Was he overly optimistic about provoking internal collapse in Iran after an attack?
GATES: I told him in 2009 he was wrong to assume an attack would topple the regime quickly. The Iranians are resilient; immediate popular uprisings are unlikely. Change, if it comes, is more likely to be internal fracturing within the regime over time rather than mass street revolts right away.
BRENNAN: How do you assess current Pentagon leadership and reform efforts?
GATES: I’ll avoid critiquing successors directly, but I applaud efforts to reform the acquisition system, broaden the industrial base, and bring new manufacturing capacity into defense. Reducing service autonomy in acquisition and accelerating production are important priorities.
BRENNAN: Secretary Hegseth labeled some universities “woke” and restricted troop attendance. William & Mary is on that list. Your response?
GATES: That characterization is wrong for this campus. William & Mary is military-friendly, with active ROTC ties and national security engagement. Practically, the restriction has affected one fellowship here. The military will remain connected to U.S. campuses.
BRENNAN: He’s removed many senior officers and watchdogs. Should the public and Congress be told why these personnel changes happened?
GATES: Transparency matters. I have relieved officers before, but I did it publicly and explained the rationale. When a wave of senior changes occurs, there’s an obligation to explain actions, at least to Congress. I’m concerned by the lack of clear explanation, though I don’t know the full justifications.
BRENNAN: Last topic—Cuba. The CIA director recently went to Havana. Does what happens there matter to U.S. national security?
GATES: Yes, primarily because instability could trigger a mass migration to the U.S., another Mariel-type evacuation. Cuba’s security personnel have operated abroad—Venezuela and elsewhere—so they’ve influenced regional security. The greater immediate risk is economic collapse yielding migration; avoiding that outcome is important.
BRENNAN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
GATES: Thank you.