President Donald Trump has argued that Iran is struggling to name a leader and that rival hardliners and moderates are feuding, using those divisions to explain stalled diplomacy. Multiple security and policy sources interviewed by ABC News, along with a former head of Israel’s Research and Analysis Division (RAD) Iran branch, present a different picture.
Their assessment is that Iran’s decision-making is no longer concentrated solely around the supreme leader as it was before the war, but neither are the regime’s core factions widely split. A regional policy source with intelligence knowledge said differences are largely about emphasis and approach rather than deep fractures at the highest level of decision-making.
Analysts describe a more militarized, IRGC-dominated leadership that operates in a politburo-like fashion. Key figures identified by security sources include Mojtaba Khamenei, a veteran of the Iran–Iraq War who assumed the supreme leader role after Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed in U.S.-Israeli strikes on Feb. 28; Brig. Gen. Ahmad Vahidi, the IRGC commander in chief; Gen. Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, head of the Supreme National Security Council and a former IRGC deputy commander; Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi, a military adviser to Mojtaba and former IRGC commander; and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the parliament speaker, chief negotiator and former IRGC commander.
There is ongoing speculation about Mojtaba Khamenei’s condition after the strike that began the war. Most sources say he is alive and involved to some extent, but difficult to reach. One senior security official said Mojtaba still makes decisions; another said he remains in hiding, avoids phone calls and meetings, and communicates through intermediaries. Those limits complicate and slow governance, prompting one source to characterize the leadership as disorganized yet still in control.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and reporting from The New York Times have described Mojtaba as badly wounded, with injuries that may make speech difficult—an explanation often offered for his absence from public view.
For U.S. and Israeli policymakers the central concern is less the formal chain of command than Iran’s apparent reluctance to compromise. An Israeli official praised the military pressure on Iran, saying it has been weakened, but warned more action or negotiation will be needed to change Iran’s posture. That official also dismissed assertions that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pushed the U.S. toward regime change.
Economic and military pressure, including a U.S. blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, has been a key tool meant to extract concessions. An Israeli source argued the blockade has been effective and has reduced incentives for Iran to offer concessions, while some American actors have signaled willingness to continue leveraging economic measures.
Danny Citrinowicz, the former head of RAD’s Iran branch and now a senior researcher, says the net result is a more militarized state under IRGC control. He warned against expecting a quick, decisive outcome from military strikes or blockades, labeling hopes for a single “silver bullet” unrealistic. Citrinowicz also said overt U.S. signaling, including social media posts by Trump, is read by Iranian observers more as a sign of desperation than a negotiating tactic. Despite degrading some Iranian offensive capabilities, he argued the war has not achieved its principal objectives.
Iran still retains substantial military capacity. U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency assessments and Israeli estimates indicate Tehran holds thousands of missiles and attack drones. Battle damage to missile launchers has been estimated at roughly 60 percent, though many systems can be repaired. The Israel Defense Forces said Iran launched more than 550 long-range missiles at Israel between Feb. 28 and the early-April ceasefire. At the start of the conflict the IDF estimated roughly 2,500 ballistic missiles in Iran’s inventory, a number that did not include shorter-range systems.
On the nuclear front, analysts warn that while Iran does not have an industrialized weapons program, it retains significant stocks of enriched material—reported at roughly 20 to 60 percent purity—that could be further enriched toward weapons-grade (around 90 percent) within weeks if centrifuge cascades were accelerated. Experts cautioned that removing certain quantities of highly enriched material discussed in talks would not eliminate Iran’s latent capability to ramp up enrichment. The IAEA has said the precise status of Iran’s program is uncertain and, as of February, could not verify inventories of centrifuges and related equipment.
Israeli officials continue to speak forcefully. Defense Minister Israel Katz said Israel is prepared to resume the war if necessary and is awaiting U.S. authorization to pursue what he described as the elimination of the Khamenei dynasty. Achieving such an outcome, however, has proven elusive to date.